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Abstract
In this paper we study the introduction of new assets which are
oftenly observed to be dened in expected values rather than state by
state, called the Arrow-Lind-Malinvaud (ALM) assets. We demonstrate
that individual default emerges naturally in an economy where such
ALM assets are introduced without completing all contingency mar-
kets. We further provide conditions under which individual default is
propagated endogenously into a collective risk of widespread default in
general equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
New nancial instruments are introduced every day including indices, deriv-
atives and innovative forms of government debt. They help manage risk and
improve economic welfare. However, they can also increase macroeconomic
volatility. The complexity of contractual obligation within a market can
transmit individual risks and amplify them into correlated or collective risks.
There are trade-o¤s arising from the gains and the losses created by nancial
innovation. This article shows the connection between nancial innovation
and default, and it focuses on the propagation of default in complex markets.
Markets can magnify risk. As new assets are introduced, a creditor who
is a victim of default in one transaction is unable to deliver in another,
thereby causing default elsewhere. In this manner default by one individual
leads, through a web of obligations, to a large number of defaults. Since
new instruments create new webs of obligations, nancial innovation is the
precipitating factor. The transmission of default from one trader to another
and from one market to another transmits individual risk and magnies it
into collective risk. Default by one individual leads to a collective risk of
widespread default.
We introduce a formal framework based on individual and collective risk.
We show how nancial instruments that are introduced to manage individual
risk often increase collective risk. The newly created uncertainty does not
originate in nature, but from market forces. It is endogenous uncertainty,
and is best formalized by a set of simultaneous decisions that a¤ect market
behavior as in general equilibrium analysis.1
Precisely how does nancial innovation lead to collective default? We
start from a large economy with an incomplete set of assets, where agents face
individual risks. A new asset is introduced, whose payo¤s are dened in terms
of expected values rather than state by state. We call these statistical assets;
similar assets have been studied in Arrow and Lind (1970), and Malinvaud
(1972, 1973), and we denote them Arrow - Lind - Malinvaud (ALM) assets.
A typical example is provided by insurance contracts, which are valued based
on their expected value. Such assets exist in large societies because of the
inherent di¢ culties of dealing with contracts whose payo¤s are contingent
1The concept of endogenous uncertainty refers to uncertainty that depends on economic
behavior along with natures moves. Chichilnisky and Wu (1992) provided the rst proof
of existence of a market equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty, see also Chichilnisky
and Heal (1993), Chichilnisky and Gruenwald (1995), Chichilnisky (1996, 1999). Kurz
(1974) dened a research agenda of endogenous uncertainty. Recent studies on this topic
include Svensson (1981), Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal (1991), Chichilnisky (1996, 1999),
Huang and Wu (1999), Kurz (1994, 1997), Kurz and Wu (1996), and Wu and Guo (2003,
2004).
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on each individuals state2, such as those in the Arrow- Debreu model. The
next step is to show in Section 3 how individual default emerges with such
ALM assets, and how individual default is propagated and magnied into a
collective risk of widespread default once the new asset is introduced.
Since the value of a newly introduced ALM asset is determined in terms
of statistics this creates states of default. For example, in Malinvaud (1972),
the statistic is the expected number of people who are ill, and the random
variable is the number of sick people. As the population size increases, the law
of large numbers predicts that the random variable representing the number
of sick people converges to a xed proportion almost surely. Therefore in
the limit, but only in the limit, insurance that is provided at actuarially
fair prices - expected value - matches premium precisely to the insurance
payments. However, when the economy is large but nite, no matter how
close we are to the limit, the law of large numbers does not operate exactly.
Therefore insurance contracts designed to deal with an exact proportion of
sick people will not be able to cope with actual payments in those cases where
the realized numbers exceed the limiting proportions. Insurance contracts
o¤ered at actuarially fair values (even with a premium) promise payments
that exceed physical endowments, with small but positive probability. This
is how default arises when ALM assets are introduced.3 Default is a typical
problem in large economies with individual risks, since in such economies it
is standard to use statistics to describe the characteristics of a group.
The next step is to show how individual risk, which in the limit is a
statistically insignicant event, can be propagated and magnied into a ma-
jor widespread default. Once default occurs the complexity of the webs of
trades within the economy determines how widely it spreads, and the to-
tal amount defaulted. The main result is Proposition 1 in Section 3, which
proves the existence of a general equilibrium with default when agents recon-
tract trades in the default states. The default statesare collective states
that are dened following the introduction of the ALM asset; each repre-
sents endogenous uncertainty, namely uncertainty that is generated by the
functioning of the economy. In Section 4, we show that in an open set of
economies called complex economies, individual default leads to a wide-
spread default no matter how large the economy is, i:e. no matter how close
we are to the limiting economy. Proposition 2 shows that in a robustset
2Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1996) demonstrated that an appropriate combination of
Arrow securities and mutual insurance policies can achieve e¢ cient allocation in a world of
individual and collective risks. However, in the real world there may not exist a complete
set of such assets. Once we depart from the complete market economy of Cass, Chichilnisky
and Wu (1996), default will occur.
3Di¤erent ways to initiate default were studied in Dubey and Geanakoplos (1989),
Zame (1993) and Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005).
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of large but nite complex economies, there exists a set of collective states
with positive probability each, where an overwhelming majority of the house-
holds in the economy default. Following the main results we show examples
of economies where the expected level of default increases with the size of
each (nite) economy, although at the limit, by the law of large numbers,
there is no default. Propositions 3, 4 and Example 4 in Section 5 establish
that the expected value of default may exceed any bound as the population
size increases, no matter how close the economy is to its limit, and that the
probability of default may decrease as more nancial reserves are required.
An Appendix provides the mathematical proofs, and Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Risk: Individual and Collective, Exogenous
and Endogenous
Uncertainty is represented by random variables; each realization of the ran-
dom variable is called a state. It is customary to refer to collectiveand
individualrisks by dening collectiveand individualstates. Collective
states are realizations of random variables that a¤ect all individuals of the
economy, such as an earthquake. They are described by a list of all individ-
ualsstates, which may or may not be correlated. An individual state is
instead a realization of a random variable that a¤ects one individual at the
time, such as an accident or illness.
2.1 Exogenous Individual Risk and Endogenous Col-
lective Risk
We introduce here a second classication of risk, distinguishing between ex-
ogenous states, which describe natures moves, and endogenous states,
which describe those events that depend on endogenous behavior and cannot
be predicted with certainty by the agents of the economy.
Combining the two classications we use exogenous collective states
to describe moves by nature that a¤ect all individuals in the economy. These
are the only type of states considered by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959).
Exogenous individual states are also natures moves, but they a¤ect only
one individual at the time. These are the states considered in Arrow and
Lind (1970) and Malinvaud (1972,1973).
In this paper we explore an important case where individual and collective
risks are simultaneously determined. The connection between individual and
collective risks is mediated by economic behavior.
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Figure 1: Classication of Risk. Assets introduced to hedge individual risk
increase collective risk.
Assume that the economy is large but nite. It would be cumbersome
to create contracts that depended on the states of each individual, because
the lists of all individual states would be too numerous. For example in an
economy with 100 individuals each of whom can be in two states (healthy
or ill) a complete list of all possible states of each individual at the time
contains 2100 elements (see Malinvaud (1972, 1973)). Clearly, assets that
promise payments contingent on such long list of states would be impractical.
Therefore in large economies it is natural to observe the introduction of assets
that promise payments based on statistics rather than state - by - state.
We show below that the introduction of a statistical asset of the Arrow-
Lind-Malinvaud type lead to new states of default. Furthermore, and sep-
arately, we show later that the complexity of contractual obligations in the
economy transmits and enlarges this risk into states of collective default.
In other words, we show that the introduction of certain assets to deal
with individual risks increases collective risks. Although the individual risks
are exogenous, depending on states of nature, the new collective risks are
endogenous, depending also on economic behavior such as how many agents
trade with those who defaulted. We may summarize this observation by say-
ing that assets introduced to deal with exogenous individual risks create
new endogenous collective risks. Figure 1 illustrates this observation:
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2.2 An Economy with Individual Risk
This section formalizes a general equilibrium economy with individual risk
and default, using Malinvauds (1972, 1973) model as a benchmark. Our
economy di¤ers from Malinvauds in that he considers only one agent type
and we consider many. In addition, we also formalize later the concept of
default. First we establish the notation. Consider an exchange economy with
N consumption goods, indexed by n = 1; :::; N with the N - th good as the
numeraire (pN = 1). There are H households, divided into types indexed by
i = 1; :::; I, and Hi households of type i, so that H =
P
iHi.
Each household faces the same set of S individual states, indexed by
s = 1; :::; S. Let the set of collective states be denoted by 
 = f :  =
(s1; :::; sh; :::; sH ); sh = 1; :::; S g, which consists of all possible lists of the
individual states for the H individuals, with SH elements. Let s(h; ) be the
individual state given by the h  th component of the collective state , and
ris() be the proportion of all households of type i for whom s(h; ) = s.
Then
PS
s=1 ris() = 1. Let ri() = (ri1(); :::; riS()) be the vector of these
proportions of households of type i among S individual states for any given
collective state . Then ri() 2 , the S 1 - dimensional simplex. Similarly
let r() be the proportion of households of all types for a given collective
state, r() = (r1(); ::; rI()) 2 I .
Let RH be the set of vectors r() when  runs over 
, then r() 2
RH is called an aggregate collective state because it is dened only by
providing the proportions of individuals who are in each state (for each type),
and does not contain any information about the identities of the individuals
themselves. RH is contained in I and has A = i(
Hi+S 1
S 1 ) elements. Note
that the probability H(r) of the aggregate collective state r on RH can be
nondegenerate and arbitrary. Let us show its property with an example in
which RH has H+1 elements, and H(r) is dened for these H+1 elements.
Consider the case when there is only one type (I = 1). For example,
when there are S = 2 individual states, say, sick or healthy denoted by 0
or 1, there are 2H collective states denoted by  2 f(s1; :::; sH); sh = 0 or
1g , with H as the number of households in this economy. Let us be more
specic and set H = 4. Then  = (1; 0; 0; 1) is an example of collective





i=0 rs() = 1, as described above.
Hence r() = (r0(); r1()) = (12 ;
1
2
) 2 . The set of aggregate collective
states is represented by RH = f(0; 1); (14 ; 34); (12 ; 12); (34 ; 14); (1; 0)g, which is
contained in . This set has A = (H+11 ) = H + 1 = 5 elements. When the
individual risk is independently distributed, we can nd the corresponding




















, h(1; 0) = 116 .
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The denition of individual risk, as in Malinvaud (1972, 1973), does not
require that the individual probabilities be identically and independently dis-
tributed (iid) random variables, although iids certainly satisfy our denition
of individual risk. The following denition allows a wide class of populations
of random variables in which correlations may exist between individuals ran-
dom variables, provided that as the population increases in size all collective
risk disappears, or, in other words, in the limit the probability distribution
over collective states is supported on a single point. Formally, the concept of
individual risk means that the proportion r1is of type i individuals in state
s (which is generally given by a set describing all collective risks) is actually
a singleton with probability one in the limit. In other words, individual risk
means that in the limit there is only one state of aggregate collective risk in
I :
Denition 1: An economy is said to have individual risk if as H !1,
H(r)! 1(r) where 1(r) is a point distribution on I namely 1 is a
degenerate distribution concentrated on one point r1 2 I , 1(r1) = 1:
In our previous example (I=1) asH !1, H(r)! 1(r) with1(r) =




). In this example, 1(r) is a point distribution on  con-








) = 1. In other words, with individual
risk only one aggregate collective state will occur with probability one in a
large economy as H !1.
Let be the probability of the collective state : The following anonymity
assumption is required so that identities of individuals do not a¤ect the na-
ture of risk faced by them:
Assumption A1 (Anonymity) : r() = r(0) implies  = 0 :
The von Neumann- Morgenstern utility function of household h of type i










where xih 2 RN+ is the consumption vector. All households h of type i
have the same endowment eisr = e
i
s in any aggregate collective state r and
individual state s, and the same probabilities is for each state s:
In addition to A1, we also need the convexity assumption for the study
of the properties of a general equilibrium:
Assumption A2 (Convexity) : Individual utility functions U() are
concave.
The von Neumann - Morgenstern utility can also be written in terms of
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where xis 2 RN+ is the consumption of a household of type i in individual
state s, as explained in the Appendix.
3 A Market with Default
3.1 How does default occur?
As already noted, in a large but nite economy, excess demand may fail
to be zero at some aggregate collective states r 2 RH with positive
probabilities. This is because there are states r where the traderspromises
exceed physical constraints. Similarly, there are states r where the insurer
may fail to deliver on its promises. The purpose of this section is to formalize
how defaults occur before recontracting is negotiated in a nite economy E.
The aggregate collective states give us all information needed to nd
out whether default has occurred without recontracting. For each aggregate
collective state r 2 RH , households face a price vector pr 2 RN and choose
xisr, the demand of households of type i in the aggregate collective state r
and individual state s: It is derived from maximizing their utility function




sr   eis) = vis
where vis is the net transfer of numeraire good from the insurance contract
or the ALM asset to households of type i in state s = 1; :::; S:
For each price vector pA = (pr)r2RH 2 RNA, the excess demand corre-
spondence isr(pr) has typical elements x
i
sr   eis; and the aggregate vector of











where ris is the proportion of individuals of type i in the individual state s
within the aggregate collective state r:
Denition 2: There is individual default in state r at equilibrium prices
p without recontracting if some coordinate of the aggregate excess demandP
i;sHiris(
i
sr(pr)) is strictly positive; r is then called a state of individual
default without recontracting.
The set of all individual default states without recontracting is denoted
by 	: Specically from now on we consider for each r the di¤erence between








where vis is the transfer from the insurer to a household of type i in individual
state s: HereM(r) can be considered as a deviation from Walrass Law when
recontracting is not yet allowed. The insurer is a (private or public) company
who is risk neutral with an initial endowment e , the same in all states, and
a utility function W (y) =
P
r ryr; where y 2 RNA as in denition 4 below,
where W (y) denotes the expected return of a risk neutral insurer.
Denition 3: Any aggregate collective state r with M(r) > 0 is dened
to be a state of insurance default without recontracting.
The set of insurance default states is denoted by  . We also write  H
and DH to indicate their dependence on the population size H. Let r be the
union of the sets   and 	. This set is the set of all default states. In the
following example we demonstrate how default occurs in an economy with
ALM assets, in which r =  .
Example 1: An Economy with Default Risk
There are I = 3 types of households, H of each, three goods, N = 3, and
two states of individual risk for each household, S = f1, 2g. Assume that for
each i and all s, individual risk is dened by is = 0:5, and that individual
risks are identical and independently distributed random variables. H is
assumed to be even so that H=2 is an integer and there exist aggregate






where U i is state independent and Cobb - Douglas (the same for all s),




sn). When consumption of good m is state independent it is denoted
xim. Endowments of households of type 1 and 3 are state independent; they
are denoted e1 = (0; 1; 0) and e3 = (1; 0; 0). Type 2 households have di¤erent
endowments in state 2, the unfavorable state, than in state 1, the favorable
state: e22 = (0; 0; 0) and e
2
1 = (0; 0; 2). This implies that there are 2
H col-
lective states denoted by  in 
 (rather than 23H), because only agents of
type 2 face individual risk. There are A = H + 1 aggregate collective states
denoted by r in R, each identied by the proportion of agents of type 2 who
are in state 2. The utilities of type i households U i : R3+ ! R are:
U1 = 4 ln x11 + ln x
1
2
U2 = 1=2(4 ln x212 + ln x
2
13) + 1=2(4 ln x
2
22 + ln x
2
23)
U3 = 4 ln x33 + ln x
3
1
The market is incomplete so far because there are no assets to deal with
the risk faced by the second type of household.
An ALM asset is now introduced, i:e. a set of transfers across di¤erent
states with expected value equal to zero. We now compute an equilibrium
of this economy, as dened above. Let p = (p1; p2; p2) and assume that good
3 is the numeraire, p3 = 1. Type 2 wants to purchase insurance o¤ered
by the insurer, called agent type 0: type 2 pays q units of the numeraire
(good 3) in both states and receives 1 unit of good 3 in the unfavorable state
(s = 2), q is the insurance premium for each unit of this contract. Let  be
the amount of insurance contract purchased by type 2. Both p and  are
determined endogenously. The insurer, type zero, who is risk neutral has
utility only for good 3, and o¤ers an insurance contract that is actuarially
fair, i. e. q = 2s = 1=2, with zero expected value (either due to competition











23 = (1  q) , s = 2;
obtaining
x212 = (4=5)(2  q)=p2 x213 = (1=5)(2  q);
x222 = (4=5)(1  q)=p2 x223 = (1=5)(1  q):
With actuarially fair insurance q = 1=2, we obtain  = 2 and the demand













x11 = 4p2=5p1; x
1
2 = 1=5; x
1
3 = 0:
x31 = 1=5; x
3
2 = 0; x
3
3 = 4p1=5p3:







The equilibrium consumption vectors are:
x1 = (4=5; 1=5; 0); x2 = (0; 4=5; 1=5); x3 = (1=5; 0; 4=5)
Note that the insurer collects one unit q = 1 of the numeraire good
from type 2 households in state 1 and gives one unit of the numeraire good
to those who are in state 2. Once individual risk is realized, it is clear that
default occurs for some aggregate collective states (r > 1
2
) when those in bad
state outnumber those in good state. There are more than one half of type 2
households who are in the unfavorable state; such a default state is in  . }
3.2 Default and Recontracting
When default occurs, the actual insurance payments are assumed to be made
proportionally to what is owed. Because of limited liability, individuals have
to recontract to reach a new equilibrium. We consider below the framework
that at each default state d 2 r, individuals recontract with each other,
so that new net trades and market clearing prices emerge at each default
state. The informational structure of the model is similar to that of the
Arrow and Debreu model: privacy is preserved in the sense that individuals
know their own endowments and preferences but not those of others. Let us
understand how recontracting can reach a new equilibrium by the following
example.
Example 2: Default Equilibrium with Recontracting
After the insurance contract is introduced in the economy of Example 1,
and over under payment to the insuree occurs, new state contingent prices
and allocations emerge. We compute these now.
The total number of aggregate states in the perfect foresight equilibrium
is V + 1, one for the no-default state and V default states with V = H=2 if
H is even and V = (H + 1)=2 if H is odd. In terms of the notation of the
last section, 2s = 1=2 (s = 1; 2), vis =  1 if s = 1, and vis = 1 if s = 2 and
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type i = 2. Note that r 2   (insurance default state) if r > 1=2. For r 2  ,




2 = 2(1   r), p3 = 1. Furthermore,
default is denoted by sr; sr = 0 if s = 1, sr =  1 + (1  r)=r < 0 if s = 2:
Type 2 agents purchase full insurance as in Example 1. After the real-
ization of individual state (s = 1; 2) for type 2, there are 2H collective states
and A = H + I aggregate collective states, indexed by r = 0; ::; 1, i:e. by the
proportion of type 2 agents in the unfavorable state 2.
When r > 1=2, and s = 2, the adjusted payment with recontracting from
the insurer is only (1   r)=r < 1 (due to the limited liability provision).
This is a default state, r 2  . If s = 1, type 2s endowment is (0,0,1) for
(1   r)H of them; for the same case but when s = 2, type 2s endowment
is (0; 0; (1   r)=r) for rH of them. Given these endowments, type 2 agents
maximize utility U2 and we derive type 2s demand:
(1   r)H of type 2s demand is x21 = 0, x22 = (4=5)(1=p2), x23 = 1=5;and
excess demand is (0; 4=5p2; 4=5): A proportion rH of type 2s demand
is x21 = 0, x
2
2 = (4=5p2)(1   r)=r, x23 = (1=5)(1   r)=r; and excess de-
mand is (0; (4=5p2)(1   r)=r, ( 4=5)(1   r)=r): Type 1s excess demand is
((4p2=5p1); ( 4=5); 0), and there is H of them. Type 3s excess demand is
( (4=5); 0; 4p1=5p3), for H of them.
Market clearing conditions are:
Good 1: (4p2=5p1)H   4H=5 = 0;so p1 = p2:
Good 2: (1 r)H(4=5p2)+(4H=5p2)(1 r) 4H=5 = 0; so p2 = 2(1 r) < 1:
Good 3: ( 4=5)(1 r)H (4=5)(1 r)H+(4=5)p1H = 0; so p1 = 2(1 r) < 1:
The recontracted equilibrium price vector becomes contingent on the
aggregate collective state with default (r > 1=2) is p1 = p

2 = 2(1 r), p3 = 1:
Equilibrium consumption vectors are
x1 = (4=5; 1=5; 0) (same as in Example 1, not a¤ected by default),
x2 = (0, 4=10r, (1=5)(1  r)=r) for rH of them (less consumption),
and = (0, 4=10(1  r); 1=5) for (1  r)H of them (more consumption),
x3 = (1=5; 0; (4=5)2(1  r)) (less consumption).
Note that the market clears with recontracting: sum of all demand
equals (H;H; 2(1  r)H) which is the total supply of commodities and xo =
(0; 0; 0) for the insurer.
Next we compute the equilibrium prices for aggregate collective state
without default (r  1=2):
Now type 0 receives (1  r)H of good 3 and pays out rH only, so it has
a surplus of (1  2r)H > 0 of good 3. Since by assumption, agent 0s utility
is a function of good 3 only, all the surplus (1   2r)H is consumed directly
in good 3, and this agents excess demand is the zero vector.
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3 = 1 (prices stay
constant).
Consumption vectors are
x1 = (4=5, 1=5, 0),
x2 = (0, 4=5. 1=5);
x3 = (1=5, 0. 4=5);
and
xo = (0; 0; (1  2r)H):
Note that markets clear: the sum of all demand vectors equals the total
supply of commodities. To see that E is complex we refer to the next section.
}
There are I insurance contracts or ALM assets, S - dimensional vectors
of transfers (vis), one such vector for each type of individual, i. Individuals
anticipate correctly that there is default in states d 2 r, and also the extent
of changes isd in their insurance payments (in the numeraire good) to the i-th
type of household in individual state s for default states d . The value of their
consumption in such states does not exceed the value of their endowment plus
the anticipated (reduced) insurance payments received. Then an individuals
income is now contingent on the aggregate collective state of the economy,
r. Therefore there are A states (A is the cardinality of the set RH) in the
economy. We now have NA markets with recontracting.
A price pA is now a vector in RNA. A consumption plan xi for household
h of type i consists of SA consumption vectors in RN denoted xisr, one for
each aggregate collective state r 2 RH , and individual state s. Recall that





s = 0 in all no - default states. The data of the
model, known to all the households, include now the probabilities r of all
aggregate collective states r 2 RH , in particular those of the default states
d 2 r, and also the shortfalls isd < 0 , s = l; :::; S, on the payment to the h
household of type i at the aggregate collective state r. Note that with perfect
foresight, the ALM asset with payo¤ vector (vi1; :::; v
i
S), i = 1; :::; I, ceases to
be a statistical asset and becomes a state contingent contract for the insured.
This is because the insured is now aware of the contingent payment vis + 
i
sd
in all the collective states r in which there is default, r 2 r:
In order to make explicit the asset structure of the model, we dene the
aggregate collective states as follows:
r 2  (insurance default states) = f1; :::; V g
and assume for simplicity in the exposition that there is one r without default,
r = 0 (the no default state)
12
so we can write r = 0; 1; :::; V , or r 2 f0; 1; ::; V g. The corresponding price
vector is pr, r = 0; :::; V , pr 2 RN . The two budget constraints (7) and (8)




sr   eisr) = isr + vis; r = 0; 1; :::V; s = 1; :::; S;
where is0 = 0; (i:e:when r = 0); x
i
sr 2 RN , eis 2 RN , pr 2 RN , isr and vis
are scalars. The 2operation 2is dened in a standard fashion:














for a given s, where the right hand side of (15) is an (V + 1) x 1 matrix.
Then equation (14) can be written:
















S], an (V +1) x S matrix, then
we can write (14) more compactly as follows:
(17)
[p 2 (xi1   ei1); :::; p 2 (xis   eis); :::; p 2 (xiS   eiS)] = X i
(both are (V +1) x S matrices), where X i is the payo¤matrix of asset
i:






















Note that the asset structure of E has restricted access: although there
are I insurance contracts, as many as individual types, a household of type





s = 0. The market is incomplete because there
are only I assets, while there are as many states as the cardinality of the set
RH , namely A (and A > I).
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3.3 Existence of a General Equilibrium with Default
The economy in our model has incomplete asset markets. Each asset has ex-
ogenously determined and xed yields denominated in terms of the numeraire
good. The economy has restricted access, because each type of agent can
only purchase one of the assets available in the economy (i:e. the insurance
contract of type i).
Denition 4: With H households of I types, a general equilibrium
with default and recontracting consists of a price vector pA = ( pr) 2
RNA, consumption vectors xi = (xisr) for each household h of type i with
xisr 2 RN representing consumption in the aggregate collective state r and





RN representing consumption by the insurer in aggregate collective state



































over the set of y = (yr) satisfying
(11)




s if r =2 r;
and
(12)
pr(yr   e) = c; c  0 if r 2 r :
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sr   ei) + (yr   e) = 0:
Proposition 1 below o¤ers the rst result on the existence of a competitive
equilibrium with default in a world with individual and collective risks. (All
proofs are in the Appendix.) As a prepatory result we present the following








sr   eis) = 0, for r = 0; 1; :::; V:
The Walrass Law may not be satised in an economy without recontract-
ing (see section 3.1), but it holds in the current framework with recontract-
ing. With the help of Walras Law, we can obtain the existence of a general
equilibrium as in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that the economy E satises A1 and A2,
and that recontracting occurs after default. There exists a general
equilibrium with default and recontracting in the economy E with
incomplete markets.
The economy E is also denoted EH to indicate the number of its individ-
uals. Note that the condition of individual risk implies that as the number of
individuals H goes to innity, the economy EH converges to a limiting econ-
omy denoted E1, which is identical to the limit of the Malinvaud economies
EM . Formally, limH!1EH = E1 = EM , as discussed in Section 2 and in
Appendix.
Alternatively, if the number of individuals H remains constant but we
substitute the probability distribution  on R by the singular probability
1 = lim H supported on the single aggregate collective state r1, we ob-
tain an economy E with the same nite number of individuals (H) but with
a unique aggregate collective state r1 almost surely. Then 8i; s is = r1is .
There is no insurance default in E and excess demand is identical to ex-
pected excess demand almost surely. In per capita terms E is identical to
E1. There is no collective risk in E because there is only one aggregate
collective state r1 almost surely; all individual risk is covered by the insur-
ance contracts (vis) which never default. E
 behaves as E is expected to, but
sometimes doesnt. For this reason E is called a benchmark for E: It is
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straightforward to show the following result:
Lemma 2: The benchmark economy E is a complete market
economy with no default almost surely.
4 Complex Economies
The introduction of a statistical asset of the ALM type transforms individ-
ual risk into collective risk of widespread default in an incomplete market
economy. In our examples we showed how the complex web of contractual
obligations amplies individual default into collective default. Crucial to
these examples is the complex web of contractual obligations that the econ-
omy has in equilibrium, which magnies individual default. This section
seeks to focus on the complexity of this web of transactions, and it does so
by introducing a new concept that formalizes complexity. We aim to deter-
mine the extent to which there is a chain reaction of defaults in an economy
where the trade patterns are highly interlinked. The economys complexity
therefore determines the extent to which there is a multiplier e¤ect for
policies designed to prevent nancial default.
Example 3: A Complex Economy with Collective Risk of Default
The economy E in example 1 is complexas we are going to dene: for
each good there is only one type of household who is a net importer and only
one type of household who is a net exporter. For each aggregate collective
state r > 1=2, the insurer (type 0) collects one unit of the numeraire good
from (1  r)H of type 2 households in good state and has to deliver to rH of
type 2 household in bad state. With limited liability, the insurer can deliver
only (1   r)=r < 1 unit of the numeraire good to those households in bad
state. This is the initial default started by the insurer with an actuarially
fairinsurance contract, which is an example of the ALM asset as discussed
in the previous sections.
Suppose that recontracting is not considered and the price is not yet
adjusted from the equilibrium level without default: p1 = p2 = p3 = 1.
Without default, the original contracts specify that type 2 households deliver
4=5 units of good 3 and receive 4=5 units of good 2, type 1 households deliver
4=5 units of good 2 and receive 4=5 units of good 1 and type 3 households
deliver 4=5 units of good 1 and receive 4=5 units of good 3. The initial default
by the insurer, for any r > 1=2, generates a chain reaction of defaults. First,
rH of type 2 households have to default from the original contract as they












units of good 2.
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 (1   r)H =  4
5
H
  2(1   r) with 2(1   r) < 1. These purchase orders
are distributed proportionally to type 1 households, with each receiving 4
5

2(1   r) units of purchase order. So all H of type 1 households obtain less
income and have to default on their original promise of purchasing 4=5 units
of good 1. Instead, each of them can purchase only 4
5
2(1 r) units of good
1. Similarly, type 3 households have to default and reduce their purchase of
good 3.
In this economy default starts with a single agent(insurer) on an insurance
contract and spreads through a complex web of transactions to (2 + r)H
households, whenever the aggregate collective state is r with r > 1=2, r 2
RH . The total amount of default for r > 1=2, as compared to a benchmark
economy without default, is equal to those default occurred for the promised




H(2r   1) + 4
5
H(2r   1) + 4
5
H(2r   1) = 12
5
H(2r   1):







 (2r   1);
and the expected amount of default is equal toX
r2 
rD(r):
Our previous denition of a general equilibrium with default and recontract-
ing allows the households to renegotiate new contracts to settle default, with
the help of a set of new prices. In this example, given r > 1=2, the new prices
p1 = p2 = 2(1 r) and p3 = 1 help to reach an equilibrium with recontracting
as in Denition 4. }
As already noted, there exist aggregate collective states r in R where the
insurer cannot meet promised payments to individuals, namely when r 2  .
In the (nite) perfect foresight economy E, individuals take these defaults
into account, and adjust their consumption in state r appropriately (Section
3, denition 4). In Section 3 we also dened a benchmark economy for the
purpose of comparing it with E, and measuring default and complexity. We
consider default in a state r 2   where the insurer fails to honor its payment
vis to an individual h of type i in individual state s at a collective state r,
and examine how many other individuals default as a consequence.
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Default therefore identies the decrease in the value of a contract resulting
from a failure in payments by the insurer. The complexity of the economy
measures how many other individuals default in state r as a consequence of
the default by the insurer on payments to individual of type i: (see Example
1)
Denition 5 : The economy E is said to have complexity k at a
default state r, when there are k defaults following any one default, at any
equilibrium allocation of E.
Note that the concept of default considered here refers to contracts (net
trades) for delivery to the market exchange or to an auctioneer, as in
the Arrow - Debreu market formulation. In other words, no information is
given here about who trades with whom or how much. Such information is
explicitly forbidden by the assumption of preserving privacy. In our context,
default involves simply an equilibrium net trade vector at a default state
which di¤ers from that contracted at a no - default equilibrium.
The concept of complexity and the analysis of complex economies is useful
for two reasons. The rst is for gauging the collective nature of the states of
default in the economy E dened in Section 3. For example, in an economy
with complexity k  H=2, a default state involves defaults by a large number
of individuals. The default states in E are always collective states, because
they depend on the number of people in a bad state across the population.
However, the collective nature of these states is emphasized further when the
complexity of the economy if high. In such economies the states of default not
only depend on a collective state (the number of people in a given individual
state) but also a¤ect a large number of individuals as well. This is formalized
in Proposition 2.
Consider now an economy E with N goods, H individuals of I di¤erent
types. There are S individual states. Each individual of type i has an
endowment eis and utility functions as in (2) and W (Section 3, (10)). In
addition, an S vector of transfers (vis) is available to each individual of type i
provided it has zero expected value. The economy can be described therefore
as E = (N , H, I, ets, W
i, W ). Insurance contracts do not appear in this
parameterization, since they are chosen as an optimal set of transfers (vis),
s = 1; :::; S, by the individuals of type i, among all possible transfers of zero
expected value. The space E of all such economies can be parameterized
by the endowments feisg 2 RNSI and by the utilities W i, i = 1; :::; I, and
W , and topologized by the product topology  dened by the Euclidean
metric on endowments and the Whitney C2 topology on the space of C2
utility functions. The Whitney topology on the space of C2 functions
Uh : RN ! R is dened by specifying neighborhoods of zero, since this is
a linear space (Smale (1974), Peixoto (1967)). Such a neighborhood Mf is
dened by each strictly positive continuous function f : RN ! R as follows:
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the function U 2 Vf i¤ kU(x)k < f(x), kDU(x)k < f(x), kD(U(x)k < f(x)
for all x 2 RN where D U and D2U are the rst and second derivatives
of U , and k:k is the Euclidean norm in nite dimensional spaces. An open
set of economies in the space E means an open set in the topology  , as
endowments and utilities vary.
Proposition 2. Let N > H and k  2. There exists in E an open
set of economies of complexity k:
Proof : In the Appendix:
Proposition 2 shows that there exists an open set of economies E with
complexity k, for any k  2. This establishes that in an open set of economies
the states of default a¤ect at least k individuals. Therefore when k is large,
the risk of default cannot be hedged properly by insurance.
The following corollary refers to small variations of the endowments of
the economy, leaving utilities invariant. The set of economies is now parame-
terized by its endowments and these are endowed with any bounded measure
which is positive on open sets. The corollary follows from Propositions 1 and
2 and the fact that open sets have positive measure.
Corollary 1: Let N  H, and k  H. Then there exists a set
of positive measure of Arrow -Debreu economies which are k -
complex, for any default level  > 0:
5 Asymptotic Risk and Financial Reserves
In this section we consider the asymptotic properties of our economy with
default. We also examine whether the default problem goes away once we
incorporate reserves into the equation to reduce such risks. This section
considers this possibility and shows that, while the risk of default can be
reduced using reserves, it cannot be eliminated.
Consider now the economy E dened in Section 3, which we now shall
denote also EH in order to highlight the number of its individuals, H. In
order to study the asymptotic properties of this economy, we shall analyze a
sequence of economies EH as the number of individuals tends to innity, i:e.
H !1.
In order to study the asymptotic behavior of economies where assets are
valued in terms of statistics, (i:e. ALM assets) we now need a few deni-
tions. Recall that the set rH represents all states of default in the economy
EH , and H(rH) its measure, and that convergence of probabilities means
weak convergence (Billingsley, l968). Consider an economic statistic on an
endogenous risk, such for example the expected value of total default of the
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economy EH , or the expected value of per - capital default of EH . Formally,
an endogenous economic statistic is dened as a continuous function from
the space (FH x EH) of all probability distributions on the space of collec-
tive states RH times the space of economies EH , into the real numbers, R,
i:e. s(g; EH) 2 R. Notice that an endogenous economic statistic is dened
continuously for probability distributions and economies with a population
of a xed size H.
Now consider as in Section 3 the product of the (S   1) - dimensional
unit simplex with itself I times, denoted I . A point in I represents a
proportion of each type i = 1; :::; I in each of the S individual states. Then
a probability measure H on RH denes a measure on I , supported on a
nite subset of I , given say by a density function H(r) for r 2 RH , as
represented in Figure 2 below (see also Malinvaud (1973)):
The shaded area contains the support of the distribution over collective
states in the nite economy; the point inside it indicates the support of the
limiting distribution which is a point because of the assumption of individual
risk.
As already mentioned, the assumption of individual risk in Section 3,
implies limH!1(H) = 1, a degenerate measure on I supported in one
point only, denoted r1. Note that even if the endogenous economic sta-
tistic s(g; EH) is a continuous function of g 2 FH for a xed population
size H, convergence in measure of the probabilities H need not imply that
limH!1 s(H ; EH) = s(1; E1), since the value of the endogenous statistic
s depends on the behavior of the economy EH as well as on the probabilities
H .
In the following, if fbng is a sequence of real numbers we say that fbng =
O(lnH) if limH!1[bn=lnH] = 1. A class of economies is called robust
when it is an open set in the topology on the space of all economies dened
in Section 4. If the class of economies has variable population H = 1; 2; :::,
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then we say that the class is robust when it is an open set under the topology
dened in Section 4 for each population size H:
The following Proposition 3 considers a class of economies of population
size H and of complexity H. Figure 3 below illustrates such an economy.
It consists of a number of traders each of whom owns one good only, and
derives utility from a di¤erent good. The economy has one importer and
one exporter for each good. In this economy, default by one trader leads to
default by all traders, as shown in detail in the Appendix. Therefore this
economy has maximum complexity. As H increases, the number of agents
and of goods increases with H :
Proposition 3: Consider a sequence of increasingly large and
complex economies EH with a population of H individuals facing
individual risk, H !1 and satisfying H(rH) = O(lnH). Then the
expected value of default increases with the size of the population
H. The result is robust as it holds for an open set of economies.
The following example shows a class of economies EH in which as the
number of agents increases and the number of goods remains constant or
increases, the per capita endowment of each agent need not increase, and
default occurs to every household in the economy.
Example 4: There exists a robust class of economies in which
autarky occurs in states of default, for all population levels.
Consider an economy EH with Hi households of type i, i = 1; :::; I, a
total population of
P
iHi = H. There are N  1 goods. One type, type 1,
faces uncertainty: the households of type i can be in one of two individual
states S = f0; 1g. The unfavorable state is 1, and 0 is the favorable state.
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The endowments of households of type 1 are (0; :::; 0) 2 RN in the unfavor-
able state and (1,0,...,0) in the favorable state where the rst good is the
numeraire. Assume that the distribution of risks over aggregate collective
states for households of type 1 is given by a probability distribution H de-
ned by H(1; :::; 1) = 1=(2 ln H); H(1; :::; 1; 0; :::; 0) = Hf1=2 Hi in state
1 and 1=2 Hi in state 0g = 1=(2 ln H); and H(0; :::; 0) = 1  (1=ln H). For
all other aggregate collective states r, H(r) = 0. The individual prob-
abilities for households of type 1 are o = 1=(4 lnH) + (1   1=lnH) =
(4 lnH   3)=(4 ln H), and 1 = 1=(2lnH) + 1=(4 lnH) = 3=(4 lnH), so
that o + 1 = 1. Then the probabilities H ! 1 weakly, where 1 is
the probability measure which assigns measure 1 to the aggregate collective
state r1 where everyone of type i is in the favorable state s = 0, i:e. r1is = 1
if s = 0, r1is = 0 if s = 1(i = 1). Therefore the conditions for individual risk
are satised.
Individuals of type 1 purchase actuarially fair insurance to equate con-
sumption in the two states: they contract to pay a premium 1 in state 0
and receive a payment 0 in state 1. For any nite H, there is one aggregate
collective state of insurance default, denoted rH , which occurs with probabil-
ity 1=(2 lnH) : when all households of type 1 are in state 1. The probability
of rH goes to 0 with H. Assume now that the economy EH is complex, as
in the example of Section 3 and as illustrated in Figure 3; it has a unique
equilibrium in which there is one type which is a net importer of each good,
and one type which is a net exporter of each good. At the equilibrium prices
of EH all the households of type 1 have zero endowments and trade nothing
in the default state; by construction, no one else will trade in this state ei-
ther, leading to autarky. Therefore as H increases, the economy is always in
autarky in the default state rH . This example is robust for small changes in
initial endowments and preferences, since the net trades at equilibrium are a
continuous function of endowments and preferences in the chosen topology.
}
We may assume that the excess (positive) returns on insurance premium
over payments are saved as reserves, and used to cover the (negative)
shortfalls in the unfavorable collective states. A natural question is whether
default may be avoided by requiring that the agents hold their positive prots
from favorable collective states in nancial reserves and use these reserves to
satisfy claims in unfavorable collective states. However, unless reserves which
equal the maximum exposure are required, the problem of default emerges all
the same and leads to the same consequences. The only di¤erence is in the
probability of default which is typically decreased. This provides support
to policies requiring some forms of reserves in the insurance and banking
industry and in nancial markets, which can enhance the nancial stability
of the economy. We show that requiring reserves reduces the problem of
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default.
Proposition 4: Increasing nancial reserve will reduce the prob-
ability of default in any economy, but a positive probability of
default still remains.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the e¤ect of introducing ALM assets in a large but nite
economy. Examples of ALM assets are actuarially fair insurance contracts, or
shares in a rm which maximizes expected prots. States of default emerge
because ALM assets promise deliveries that sometimes exceed physical en-
dowments.
Proposition 1 proved the existence of an equilibrium with recontracting
and endogenous uncertainty on the contracts default. The new states of
default in E are collective states because they depend on collective events,
such as the proportion of the population in each individual state. We showed
that in complex economies many individuals default at once at each state of
default, emphasizing the collective nature of default.
Proposition 2 shows that there is an open set of complex economies of
complexity k, for any k  2. In such economies default by one individual
leads to default by k individuals, due to the pattern of trading.
The introduction of ALM assets to hedge against individual risk therefore
may increase collective risk of default.
We studied expected default as the population size increases without
bounds. At the limit, and only at the limit, the economies have no default.
This is because the distribution of risks across the population converges with
certainty to a known one.
Although the introduction of new assets, such as health insurance policies,
may enhance the welfare of individuals, our results illustrate a familiar con-
cern about nancial innovation. The concern is that the introduction of new
nancial assets could in some circumstances lead to more instability, namely
to new states of collective default. The results we presented formalize this
concern. They o¤er a way to measure the benets of nancial innovation, as
well as its drawbacks.
The key is to understand the two circumstances under which collective
risk increases with introduction of new nancial assets. These circumstances
are: the assets are ALM, and the economies are complex. The rst feature of
the problem, that the assets be ALM, is almost inevitable in large economies
with individual risk, because of the di¢ culty of creating assets that depend
on long list of individual characteristics, most of which are di¢ cult to ob-
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serve. So this rst condition cannot be avoided. The second feature refers
to the complexity of the economy. The introduction of an asset typically
increases the web of trading in an economy and thus its complexity. Certain
assets increase the collective risk of default more than others. They create
correlatedrisks which cannot be properly insured. The computation of the
collective risk of default and the total expected default from di¤erent assets,
as dened in Section 5, could help to determine the extent of collective risk
introduced by the asset.
An interesting area of research would include the computation of the
costs and benets from the introduction of new securities. The benets can
be measured in terms of Pareto improvements in welfare, and the costs could
be measured in terms of the increase is collective risks and complexity of the
economy, which make it more vulnerable to nancial instability.
The other implication of our results is that they help to formalize a mul-
tiplier e¤ect" for policy. In a complex economy, nancial policies which
succeed in preventing default by one agent also prevent, by a chain reaction,
a large number of other defaults at no additional cost. Therefore the bene-
ts have a multiplier e¤ect". Our results provide support for the policy of
requiring reserves to enhance nancial stability.
The complexity of the economy is not a problem in itself, unless it leads to
large correlated risks. If following the introduction of an ALM asset a second
layer of securities is introduced to deal with the endogenous risk created by
the rst, and the latter securities are also of the ALM type, then the process
is replicated. More endogenous uncertainty may be created, piling up the
risk of default of an asset which was introduced to hedge against the risk of
default of another. These results also suggest that large and complex market
economies with individual and collective risks are likely to be incomplete.
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Appendix
A.1 Extending Malinvauds Model of Individual Risks
In this paper we extend Malinvauds model to include several types of agents,
identied by their endowments, utilities, and propabilities. One example of
Malinvauds model is provided by identically distributed and independent
(iid) random variables. With iids there is no connection between the in-
dividualsrisks; furthermore, the probability of a collective state (e:g. how
many people are ill) is derived, indeed dened from, the probability of each
individuals risks. Instead, Arrow - Debreus approach to uncertainty de-
scribed by states of natureis an extreme case of collective risk. In Arrow -
Debreu models all risk is collective, and the probability distribution of risks
for one individual is derived from, indeed is identical to the distribution for
collective risks, because all individuals are exposed to the same risks simul-
taneously. However, between these two extreme cases there are many shades
of risks which combine in di¤erent ways features of individual and collective
risks. They are represented by random variables which have individual and
collective components simultaneously.
Individual risk has a specic meaning as dened in Section 2. Malinvaud
(1973, p. 387) establishes that the probability that an aggregate collective
state r obtains and that simultaneously, for a given household h of type i, a
particular state s also obtains is (r)ris: The probability is that, for a given





A.1.1 The Arrow-Debreu Model with Contingent Contracts
Consider the set 
 of all collective states  consisting of a realization of one of
the S states for each of theH households in the economy; 
 has SH elements.
The endowments eh of a household h is an NSH dimensional vector. For each
household h of type i the endowment is the same across all collective states
in 
 in which h is at the same individual state s. A price vector p is an NSH
dimensional vector. An Arrow - Debreu equilibrium is a price vector p and
H consumption plans xh with NS
H components each, such that if individual
h is of type i, xh maximizes W
i(xh) of (1) subject to
(A.1)






(xh   eh) = 0:
A.1.2 Extending Malinvauds Model to economies with Arrow-
Lind-Malinvaud Assets
Malinvaud notes that the number of contingent markets in the Arrow - De-
breu model is impossibly high, indeed equal to NSH (an exponential function
of the number of individuals). He furthermore notes that as the population
increases, then in the limit all contracts contingent on collective states be-
come irrelevant. This is because with probability one, all collective states
become equal, with probability one, to the single aggregate collective state
r1 having a xed proportion r1is of people of each type i in each individual
state s. Since the total initial endowments in the economy and total number
of people with a given preference are xed, this leads to a xed set of prices
for the N commodities, p 2 RN (Malinvaud (1973), Proposition 5). For this
reason, he suggests that, as the number of individuals goes to innity: The
economy should be able to work properly with just N markets, one for each
good (Malinvaud (1973), P.401). This requires, however, that individuals
should be able to hedge appropriately their risk between bad and good indi-
vidual states. For this purpose, Malinvaud introduces individual insurance:
contingent commodities are substituted by an insurance system operating as
a redistribution scheme. Suppose that the individual of type i holds insur-
ance contracts that will give him or her the net transfer vis of the numeraire
good if he or she is in state s. Let now xis 2 RN be the consumption vector
by individual h of type i of the N goods in state s. Then if p 2 RN is the
vector of commodity prices, the individual of type i has a budget constraint:
(A.3)
p(xis   eis) = vis, (s = 1; :::; S)
Risk coverage means that vis will be positive in unfavorable states and
correspondingly negative in favorable states. The individual chooses net
transfers vis, depending on the terms on which such insurance contracts are
o¤ered. Malinvaud assumes that a transfer vector vis is accessible to individ-









This is admittedly a strong assumption, but we note that nothing in what
follows changes if instead the expected value is equal to a constant ci > 0,
where ci could be the return on investment across the economy in equilibrium,
or a regulated level of prots. This assumption could be formalized as an
equilibrium condition on the supply of insurance. Arrow and Lind (1970)
proposed that the expected prot should be the preferred maximum for public
rms in economies with individual risks, and indeed share holding in such
rms would also be assets valued as a function of their expected value. With
these applications in mind, we consider more generally any asset which is
o¤ered at a price which is a function of its expected value, and we call this
an Arrow - Lind - Malinvaud (ALM asset). The introduction of such






ExtendingMalinvauds equilibrium EM with insurance to economies
with several types of agents is dened as a vector of prices p 2 RN , and
for each household of type i = 1; :::; I, a consumption plan xi = (xis )
S
s=1 2
RNS which maximize W i, as dened in (3), subject to (A.3) with the net





(xis   eis) = 0;














s   eis) = 0.
When the right hand side of equation (A.6) is substituted by ci as in
(A.5), then we call this an equilibrium with individual risk and Arrow
- Lind - Malinvaud (ALM) assets. Related concepts of equilibrium with
zero expected excess demand have been studied by Hildenbrand (1971) and
Wu (1988).
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A.1.3 An extension to Markets with an Innite Number of Indi-
viduals of Each Type
Assume now that there are innitely many individuals of each type i. Then by
the assumption of individual risk, is = r1is , where r
1 2 I is the support of
the limiting probability 1 namely the (unique) limiting aggregate collective
state giving a xed proportion r1is is of individuals of type i which are in
individual state s. Per capita expected excess demand (1=H)(p) is
now used instead of expected excess demand because the latter may not be




almost surely as H !1.
In the limit there is no default, since the proportion of people in an
individual state s within an aggregated collective state r is exactly r1is = is
by the assumption of individual risk. This limiting economy is denoted E1M .
It is straightforward to show Pareto optimality of the allocations in E1M :
A.1.4 The Utility Function of Households
Here we summarize how to represent the utility functions in di¤erent forms,
as in Section 3 of the paper. The von - Neuman and Morgenstern utility










where xih 2 RN+ , indicating that the h household of type i has preferences
on consumption which may be represented by a state separated utility
function W i dened from S elementary utility functions U is. The functions
U is are assumed to be C
2, strictly increasing, strictly quasi concave, and the
closure of the indi¤erence surfaces f(U is) 1(x)g  int(RN+) for all x 2 RN+.
We consider, like Malinvaud (1973), an important class of cases in which the
activity of the household h depends on  only through the aggregate collective
state r(). If household h takes into account rst what happens to her or
him i:e. s = s(h; ), and second which frequency distribution r() happens
to appear, but nothing else, then the consumption plan xis = x
i
s(h;)(r()).
The summation with respect to collective states  can now be made rst
with respect to each aggregate collective state. To a particular r and s for
which rs 6= 0, there usually corresponds a number of  leading to r() = r
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which depends on the type i but not on the household h. But if we make
the further assumption that the household h only takes into account what
happens to him/her, then the utility function of the i  th type of household










where xis 2 RN+ is the consumption of a household of type i in individual
state s (Malinvaud (1973), p 390, (12)). Clearly xh = xis if individual h is
of type i, and is in individual state s at the collective state :
A.2 Proof of Results
Proof of Proposition 1:
The rst part of the proof of Proposition 1 consists of verifying that
Walras Law is satised in the model of Theorem 1; it su¢ ces to prove this
for the case where the penalty for the insurer c = 0; the same proof follows
for any given c  0. We will rst prove Lemma 1.
Letr = fpr 2 RN :
PN
n=1 prn = 1g be the price simplex for the aggregate
collective state r = 0; :::; V . After we nd the equilibrium price pr 2 r with
prn > 0, we can renormalize to make p

N = 1 for the numeraire good. Let
the price simplex be denoted  = ox:::xV = XVr=0 r. In the aggregate
collective state r, the total insurance payments to all individual agents of









s, r = 0; 1; :::; V:
where ris is the proportion of type i agents in state s given the aggregate
collective state r. If ris = is for i = 1; :::; I and s = 1; :::; S, then we know




s = 0 (actuarially fair insurance). Otherwise
Tr 6= 0. If Tr  0 there is no default and the insurer (i = 0) has net income
 T0 to be spent on consumption goods in state r = 0. If Tr > 0, the insurer
has to default and consume nothing (the insurer has zero endowment, eo = 0)
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with the provision of limited liability which corresponds to the default state










sr) = 0 for r = 1; :::; V;
(A.11)
If vis  0; then isr = 0:
(A.12)
If vis > 0; then 
i
sr  0 and vis + isr  0:
Equation (A.11) means that there is no shortfall when the insurer does not
pay in state s. Equation (A.12) means that shortfalls happen only when
the insurer is supposed to pay according to the actuarially fair insurance
contract, and the shortfalls cannot exceed the originally promised payment.
Now we can state and prove the WalrasLaw in our economy.
For r = 0, and i = 1; :::; I, pr(yisr   eis) = vis, from the budget constraint
and isr = 0. For r = 0 and i = 0 (insurer), pr(y
o













s   To = 0 from (19) and
Ho = 1, ros = 1. For r = 1; :::; V , pr . (yisr   eis) = vis + isr from the budget


















from (A.10), for r = 1; :::; V . Hence Lemma 1 is proved.}
Since W i(yi) is additively separable across r and s, an equilibrium can
be represented as a pair (p; y) with p = (pr), r = 0; :::; V , pr 2 r, and
y 2 RINS(V+1), such that:
(A.13) y = (yisr), y
i
sr is in the demand correspondence D
i
sr(pr) = fyisr 2




(A.14) Bisr(p) is the budget set fyisr 2 RN : pr(yisr   eis) = vis + isrg for
s = 1; :::; S, r = 0; :::V , and markets clear:







feisg) for r = 0; :::; V:
For each r the budget set Bisr(pr) denes a non empty, compact, convex
valued and continuous correspondence, so that r(pr) is a non empty, con-
vex  valued and upper hemi-continuous correspondence (Berges theorem).
Furthermore, the excess demand correspondence r satises WalrasLaw for
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each r (Lemma 1), and the boundary condition of Debreu (1982, p. 722).
Therefore all the conditions of Theorem 8 of Debreu (1982, p. 722) are satis-
ed so that there exists a pr such that 0 2 r(pr). The vector p = (pr) and
the corresponding allocation y(p) is an equilibrium, completing the proof.}
Proof of Proposition 2: This proof has two steps: in the rst step we
construct an example of a complex economy, E. In the second step we show
that small variations of endowments and utilities from those of E will remain
within the class of complex economies. This latter step uses Smales (1974)
results which establish that for a generic (open and dense) set of economies,
the equilibrium allocations and prices depend locally continuously on the
initial endowments and preferences. We construct a complex economy in
steps.
Formally, let (xisr) denote an equilibrium allocation in E of an individual
h of type i in individual state s at a collective state r. If its m-component
(xisr   eis)m is negative, we say that h is a net importer of m, or simply an
importer of m, at this equilibrium. The same denition with the opposite
sign applies to exporters of a good m. Similarly in E individual h of type
i is a net exporter of a good m at the equilibrium allocation (xi), when
(xis   eis)m > 0, where xis is an equilibrium allocation for E. Let r be a
default state of the economy E as dened in Section 3, and for s; r let h be
an importer of good m at an equilibrium allocation of E, (zisr). Consider
an equilibrium (p, xis ) of E
, and an equilibrium allocation (xisr) of E in a
state of insurance default r 2  :
An importer h of good m in economy E is said to default at s; r when
the value of h0s net purchases of good m at the default state r 2   is lower
than what h contracted to purchase at the individual state s in E, i:e.
jpm(xisr(m)   eis(m))j < jpm(xis (m)   eis(m))j: A similar denition holds for
exporters. Note that the values are given by the equilibrium price p of the
benchmark economy E.
First consider the case N = H. Let Eo be an economy with N goods, H
households, and equilibrium prices p, where at the equilibrium allocation
corresponding to p, household 1 is the only net exporter of good 1, and the
only net importer of good 2; household 2 is the only net exporter of good 2
and the only net importer of good 3, etc., nally household H is the only net
exporter of good N , and the only net importer of good 1. Note that Eo is
complex, for any default of any amount initiated by any of the households in
any commodity n = 1; :::; H. The argument is now extended to N = H + b,
b  H. It su¢ ces to modify Eo as follows. Assume that household 1 is the
only net exporter of goods 1 and H + l, and the only net importer of goods
2 and H+2; household 2 is the only net exporter of goods 2 and H+2; etc.,
household b is the only net exporter of goods b and H + b and the only net
importer of goods b + l and 1; and nally household H is the only exporter
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of good H and importer of good H + l. The economy E1 thus dened is
clearly complex. Finally consider the general case of an economy E, where
N = aH+ b, b < N , for some a  0. Dene i mod H as the set of all natural
numbers n > H such that i is the remainder from dividing n into H, i:e.
such that i satises n = aH + i, for some a > 0. Then dene the economy E
so that household 1 is the only net importer of all goods 1 mod H and the
only net exporter of all goods 2 mod H; household 2 is the only net exporter
of all goods 2 mod H and importer of all goods 3 mod H; etc.; nally H is
the only net exporter of all goods 0 mod H and net importer of all goods 1
mod H. E is clearly complex, see Figure 3.
The complex economy F of Theorem 2. Household 1 is the only net im-
porter of all goods 1 mod H, and the only net exporter of all goods 2 mod
H. There are H households and N goods, N  H.
Such an economy E arises by assigning to household i an endowment con-
sisting exclusively of goods i mod H, a utility function with no utility for
good i mod H, and the sum of Cobb - Douglas utilities for goods i+ l mod
H. Example 1 in Section 3 illustrates such an economy. Finally note that the
complexity of E survives small variations in net trades at the equilibrium.
To see that the economy remains complex for small variations in net trades
consider the following modication of the economy E: Consider rst the
case N = H. Assume that p = (1; :::; 1)  this can always be assumed
without loss of generality by changing the commoditiesunits of measure-
ment. Now consumer 1 is no longer the only net importer of good 1, but the
main one: consumer 1 is a net importer of one unit of good 1 (in terms of
the numeraire), while all other consumers together import less than E at the
equilibrium, E < 1=2H. Similarly consumer 1 is a net exporter of one unit of
good 2, while all other consumers together export less than 1=2H of good 2,
etc., until consumerH who is a net importer of 1 unit of good 1, while the rest
of all consumers import at most 1=2H units of good H; and nally H exports
one unit of good 1, while all other consumers together export at most 1=2H
units of good 1. Then any default of at least one unit of good n, n = 1; :::; H,
leads to default by all H individuals. A small enough modication of en-
dowments and preferences of produces another complex economy. The same
argument can be employed to show that for small variations of endowments
and utilities the economy E with N = aH + b, a > 0, b < H, remains com-
plex. Therefore, E may be modied so as to be within Smales (1974) open
and sense class of economies in which net trades vary (locally) continuously
with initial endowments and utilities, and remain complex. Any further small
modication will still remain within the class of complex economies, proving
that there exists an open class of complex economies.
To prove that k - complexity is an open property when N > H, construct
an economy E where k individuals replicate economy Eo of Theorem 1, for k
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goods. Assume all other individuals have zero net trades at the equilibrium
p. Then default can only be initiated by one of k individuals, and leads to
k 1 other defaults. This example is open since for any level of default  > 0,
we can modify the original economy so that the net trades of the households
h = k + 1; :::; H add up to less than . }
Proof of Proposition 3:
This follows from Proposition 1 and the results of Section 3. In complex
economies such as E0 in Proposition 1, default always increases at least as
a linear function of the population H, while the denition of individual risk
is consistent with an arbitrary rate of convergence of the probabilities H as
H ! 1, as it requires only weak convergence of the probability measures
H ! 1, (see e:g. Malinvaud (1973), p. 387, para 4.)}
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